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Rage against the dying of the light 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
With apologies to Dylan Thomas, I believe the final two lines of his 
famous poem precisely sum up Brexit. Perhaps, at the moment of the 
Brexiters’ greatest triumph, this seems bizarre. After all, the UK is due 
to leave the EU tomorrow at 11pm. And yet, for all the arguments over 
50p and whether a clock should chime, the light will die and that good 
night will overtake us. 
What do I mean by this? For most, Brexit is intrinsically bound up with 
identity. In particular, it is bound up with a very particular form 
of English national identity. It is a particular form of identity most likely 
– but not exclusively – to be held by certain demographic groups. Yet 
this particular national identity is dying and the Brexit it envisages 
cannot be. 
Two central themes come out again and again from survey 
evidence[1] and interviews[2]. The first is a desire to repatriate decision-
making to the national level and the second is the centrality of 
migration in 2016. Contrary to what is argued by many, this wasn’t 
about Empire, a sense of aggrandisement or English exceptionalism. 
“We just want to be a normal country” was the refrain. “Take back 
control” was a powerful political slogan for precisely this reason. Like 
many of the best slogans, it spoke to people on multiple levels. Firstly, 
a great many of voters feel alienated from the centres of power – 
whether in Brussels or Westminster. 
The process of decision-making in the EU is often opaque and 
frequently unedifying. Well-remunerated, multi-lingual officials well-
versed in European politics and various political cultures – however 
competent and deserving they are – cannot help but have little in 
common with the average voter. 
Brexit must be understood domestically. Most EU-wide decisions 
have at least some British sign-off. Certainly major EU treaties 
(Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon, for example) transferring powers and/or 
competencies to the EU have done. Similarly EU enlargement has 
had a British imprimatur. The UK government had an absolute right to 
veto these things and actively chose not to. 
These decisions were irreversible. Many simply do not trust their own 
government. As an example: the possibility of Turkish accession 
played a significant role in the EU referendum. Certainly, this was 
widely dismissed by Remain-voters and leading pro-Remain 
politicians as well as other EU leaders. As a practical possibility it was 
a complete canard. However, this misses the point: voters feared the 
UK government would accede to Turkish membership of the EU at 
some point in the future. 
In this sense, alienation was with regard to Westminster as much as 
Brussels. Yet English voters have no other democratic avenue 
through which to effect policy change. This stands in stark contrast to 
Scotland where the Scottish Government enjoys (and successfully 
wields) significant devolved powers. 
Yet “taking back control” in the sense desired by those who voted for 
Brexit will not happen. Why shouldn’t nations set their own regulations 
on, for example, bananas? Well, every time a shipment involving 
bananas needs to cross an international border it will need to be 
inspected to ensure it adheres to the regulations of the importing 
country. 
Some other (non-banana) shipments will also be inspected as well in 
order to avoid banana smuggling. Of course, other things (e.g. car 
parts) are likely to get stuck in a queue of freight traffic whilst these 
banana inspections are carried out. The EU facilitates frictionless 
trade by providing countries with a mechanism to standardise banana 
regulations (and, fairly obviously, other goods). 
There is a reason for the EU’s political structures, however unwieldy 
they might be at times. The ECJ so widely cast as villainous by 
Brexiters exists so as to arbitrate when disputes over these shared 
regulations (and a great deal else) arise. 
These regulatory differences are what most free-trade agreements 
seek to minimise. Every time the UK signs one, it will be trading away 
sovereignty. “Giving away control”, so to speak. Some countries (e.g. 
India) will want to link this to relaxing immigration requirements. 
Compared to the ECJ, arbitration will be significantly more opaque. 
Moreover, even if the UK doesn’t sign any such agreements, many of 
the things we consume will adhere to the rules of a large trading bloc. 
Most UK vehicles, for example, unless actively prohibited from doing 
so will continue to adhere to EU standards in most areas. It simply is 
not worthwhile producing separate models for a market as small as 
the UK. The UK might choose to adhere to US standards in certain 
areas, but we won’t have “taken back control”: we will simply have 
chosen to delegate control to a different large trading partner. 
In practical terms, one market looms far larger than any others for our 
small country: the EU. As such, I expect the UK to cleave reasonably 
closely to EU standards in many areas. I expect to see the UK 
wielding less control over regulations post-Brexit and not more. The 
Brexit desired cannot be. 
We now come to the second element of this identity crisis: the 
impending death of Englishness. Contrary to the views espoused by 
some, this particular Englishness is not inherently racist in the sense 
of discriminating or actively disliking those who are not English. 
However, to be a white Anglo-Saxon is the default in this universe. 
Anything else (from Celt to Nigerian) is “other”. 
According to this view, the English are a nation and are entitled to 
self-determination (thus rendering England for the white, Anglo-
Saxon) English. Others are welcome as guests and may even make 
their home here, but “this land is our land”. Given this primacy, it is not 
surprising that a minority do hold actively racist views. None of this is 
new of course – witness the popularity of Enoch Powell in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
However, this identity is held most commonly by demographic groups 
that are shrinking. Within England (ironically unlike Scotland), around 
a third of babies born now have at least one parent who was born 
abroad. A significant additional number are members of ethnic 
minority groups in which both parents were born in the UK. 
It isn’t surprising that those parts of the UK where the population 
skews young identify much less strongly as “English”. Moreover, such 
an ethnocentric identity does not appeal to those growing up in a 
diverse environment and it is less likely to appeal to those who hold 
degree-equivalent qualifications. Half of 18 year-olds today go to 
university and few under-40s get their news from sensationalist 
tabloids. 
If (although I increasingly feel it is likely to be a question of when) 
Scotland chooses to leave the UK, this will accelerate. Scotland is 
considerably older and whiter than England. Make no mistake, insofar 
as Brexit is a reflection of England’s identity crisis, it is indeed a 
generation’s rage against the dying of the light. The world they spent 
much of their lives inhabiting is gone for good. The “control” they 
crave is forever lost and the national identity they hold is now going – 
admittedly not gently – into that good night. 
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